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NOTE

MAHON REVISITED: KEYSTONE BITUMINOUS COAL
ASS'N V DEBENEDICTIS, 480 U.S. 470 (1987)

INTRODUCTION

Over the past decades, land-use planners, developers and landowners
have asked the Supreme Court to determine when a land-use regulation
constitutes an unconstitutional taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment.' The power of local governments to regulate without providing just
compensation was addressed in Pennsylvania v. Mahon when Justice
Holmes stated that if a regulation goes "too far" it will be recognized as
an unconstitutional taking. 2 In Mahon, the Supreme Court struck down
a Pennsylvania statute on the ground that it destroyed the support estate3
and made the mining of "certain coal" commercially impractical. 4
In Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,5 the Court confronted Mahon in a strikingly similar factual case. The issue in Keystone
was whether the mere enactment of the Pennsylvania Bituminous Mine
Subsidence and Land Conservation Act (Subsidence Act) and regulations
adopted under the Act "go too far" so as to constitute a taking in violation
of the Fifth Amendment. 6 By operation of the Subsidence Act, the petitioners' interest in the support estate was allegedly destroyed and they
were required to leave 27 million tons of bituminous coal in the ground,
unmined. The Supreme Court distinguished Mahon and held, in a 5-4
decision, that the deprivation of the support estate and coal required by
the Subsidence Act to be left in the ground did not amount to an unconstitutional taking.7 Keystone emerges with a new lesson for landowners:
to successfully challenge a land-use regulation on the basis that it constitutes a taking under the Fifth Amendment, specificity of economic
I. The Fifth Amendment provides that private property shall not be taken for a public purpose
without just compensation. A "regulatory taking" is a taking of private property effected by an
exercise of police power and not the power of eminent domain. See generally San Diego Gas &
Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
3. The support estate is the strata of coal and earth that underlies the surface estate. See generally,
Montgomery, The Development of the Right of Subjacent Support and the "Third Estate" in Pennsylvania, 25 Temp. L.Q. 1 (1951).
4. 260 U.S. at 414.
5. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
6. Id.
7. Id. Justice Stevens wrote the opinion and was joined by Brennan, White, Marshall, and
Blackmun. Justice Rehnquist dissented while Powell, O'Conner, and Scalia joined.
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injury and diminution in value corresponding to the aggregate of one's
property rights must be shown.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

For a century, coal mine subsidence has plagued Western Pennsylvania.
The area's primary industry has left a legacy of subsidence which is
caused by the extraction of underground coal and results in the lowering
of the land surface overlying a coal mine.' Subsidence causes devastating
environmental damage. 9 In response to the dangers of subsidence, in
1966, the Pennsylvania State Legislature enacted the Pennsylvania Bi-

tuminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act and regulations
to enforce it after finding that subsidence endangered the health, safety,
and welfare of its citizens."0 To control subsidence, the act required that

50 percent of the coal beneath certain structures" be left in the ground
to provide surface support. 2
The petitioners in Keystone, five coal companies and a coal association,
were engaged in underground mining of bituminous coal in Western

Pennsylvania. In 1982, the petitioners filed a civil rights action in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania to
enjoin officials from enforcing the Subsidence Act.'" They alleged that
sections 4 and 6"' of the act violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments 5 because it denied them the economically viable
use of their land. They based their challenge on two grounds: first, that
the enforcement of the 50 percent rule under section 4 would compel
8. The lowering of strata has been documented to have devastating effects. Subsidence causes
substantial structural damage to the foundation of houses and buildings. Buildings can be cracked;
roads can be lowered or cracked; streams, water impoundments, and aquifers can be drained into
the underground excavations. Subsidence also causes environmental damage from severing oil and
gas wells which cause their contents to migrate into underground mines and aquifers. Id. at 475
n.2.
9. Id. at 474-75.
10. See Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 52, § 1406.2 (Purdon Supp. 1989). The Subsidence Act authorizes
the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources ("DER") to implement and enforce a
comprehensive program to regulate the prevention or minimization of subsidence. See 25 Pa. Code
§ 89.145 (1983).
11. Section 4 of the Act prohibits mining which causes subsidence to public buildings, noncommercial structures, dwellings used for human habitation and any cemetery. Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 52,
§ 1406.4 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
12. The 50 percent formula is applied through DER regulations, and is applicable to structures
protected under § 4 of the Subsidence Act. 25 Pa. Code § 89.146 (b)(2)(1983).
13. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 581 F.Supp. 511 (W.D.Pa. 1984), aff'd
sub nom. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. Duncan (3rd Cir. 1985), aff'd sub nom. Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1986).
14. Section 4 of the Subsidence Act as implemented by the 50 percent rule. Pa. Stat. Ann., tit.
52 § 1406.4 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
15. The Fifth Amendment was made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Chicago B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).

Fall 1989]

MAHON REVISITED

them to leave 27 million tons of coal in their mines without compensation;
second, the act and its regulations entirely destroyed the value of an estate
in land-the support estate. 6
Pennsylvania state law is unique in that it recognizes three separate
estates in land: the mineral estate, the surface estate, and the support
estate. Technically, one person may own the coal, another the surface,
and a third the right of support. 7 However, historically and practically,
the support estate is valuable only when used by one who possesses either
the mineral or surface estate.' 8 In Keystone, approximately 90 percent of
the petitioners' coal was purchased from the land owners in deeds which
severed the mineral and support estates. 9
The petitioners' challenge rested primarily upon the 1922 landmark
case, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. ° In Mahon, the Supreme Court
struck down the Kohler Act, which was "strikingly similar"'" to the
Subsidence Act on the basis that it destroyed the support estate and for
all purposes made the mining of "certain coal" commercially impractical.22 For these reasons, the Mahon Court held that the Kohler Act was
a taking without just compensation.
In Keystone, the Court distinguished Mahon and held that the Subsidence Act did not violate the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause.23 In
doing so, the Court engaged in a cost-benefit analysis by examining
whether the Subsidence Act substantially furthered a public purpose and
denied Keystone the economically viable use of its land. The Court held
that the deprivation of the support estate and the 27 million tons of coal
required by the act to be left unmined, when compared to Keystone's
full bundle of property rights, did not frustrate investment-backed expectations or cause diminution in value so as to require compensation.'
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Pennsylvania Coal Company Case
Keystone directly descends from Mahon. In Mahon, the Pennsylvania
Legislature enacted the Kohler Act which prohibited the mining of anthracite coal in a manner which would cause subsidence of land on which
certain structures were located.' The Mahons were surface owners who
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Keystone, 480 U.S. 470, 478-79; 496-97.
Id. at 500-501.
Id.
Id.at 478.
260 U.S. 393 (1922).
See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 506 (Rehnquist, J.,dissenting).
Pennsylvania v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922).
480 U.S. at 492-93.
Id. at 492-501.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393.
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purchased a residential lot from the Pennsylvania Coal Company. The
deed provided that the Company retain the subsurface mineral rights and
the support estate.26 At the time the Kohler Act was enacted, Pennsylvania
law recognized, as in Keystone, that the support estate was a separate
estate of land." After the Company notified the Mahons that it intended
to mine beneath their property, the Mahons sued under the Kohler Act
to enjoin the Company from mining coal in such a way as to cause
subsidence to their home.
Justice Holmes, writing for the Supreme Court, denounced the Kohler
Act as violating the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In Mahon,
Holmes enunciated a "diminution in value" test for regulatory takings
of property and stated that when diminution reaches a "certain magnitude,
in most if not all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and
compensation to sustain the act." 2 The rationale behind this notion is
that "the strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough
to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional
way of paying for the change.'
Under Holmes' diminution in value test, the Kohler Act violated the
Takings Clause for two reasons. First, the support estate was considered
to be a relevant property interest which the Company had retained by
deed, but lost by the operation of the act.-' Second, the act made it
"commercially impractical" to mine "certain coal." 3' In concluding that
the act effected an unconstitutional taking, Justice Holmes stated:
What makes the right to mine coal valuable is that it can be exercised
with profit. To make it commercially impracticable to mine certain
coal has very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes as
appropriating it or destroying it.32
In his dissent, however, Justice Brandeis stated that the relevant unit
of property is "relative." 33 In his view, the value of the coal kept in place
by the Kohler Act should be compared to the value of the "whole property. "'
Under this analysis, there would be no taking because the value of the
coal kept in the ground would be negligible as compared to the value of
the owner's sum of property rights.3"
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32,
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 412.
Id. at 413-14.
Id. at413.
Id, at 416.
Id. at 414.
Id.
Id. at 414.
Id. at 419 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
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What Constitutes a Taking?
Since Mahon, the Court has conceded that it has "no set formula" to
determine the point of when "justice and fairness" require that economic
injuries caused by a land-use regulation be compensated. 6 This question
depends largely upon the particular circumstances of each case, resulting
in what has been called the "crazy quilt pattern of Supreme Court doctrine" on the taking problem.37
The Two-Pronged Test
There are two prongs which the Court developed to determine when
a land-use regulation violates the Takings Clause: (1) whether it substantially advances a legitimate state interest; and (2) whether it denies
to an owner the economically viable use of his land.3' In Agins v. City
of Tiburon,39 the Court stated that the first prong necessitates weighing
the relationship between public and private interests.' A land-use regulation which substantially advances state interests is presumed to prevail
unless it frustrates economic incentives so as to amount to a taking.4
In most challenges to a land-use regulation, the decisive factor turns
on the second prong: whether the statute denies an owner the economically
viable use of the land. This determination is made by examining diminution in value and the extent to which the regulation has frustrated distinct
investment-backed expectations.42 In Penn CentralTransp. Co. v. City of
New York, 43 a New York City historic preservation statute was enacted
which, if applied, would prevent the use of air space above the historic
Grand Central Terminal." Penn Central, the terminal owner, challenged
the regulation as effecting a taking on the ground that it deprived the
company of its expectations to develop the "air space" above Grand
Central. The deprivation of use of Penn Central's "air rights" also resulted
in substantial diminution in value. The Court upheld the regulation on
36. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); see also Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979).
37. Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. Ct. Rev. 63. See Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is
Still a Muddle, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 561, 566-67 (1984).
38. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987) (citing
Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 269 (1980)).

39. 447 U.S. 255 (1979).
40. Id. at 261.
41. Id. at 260.

42. The diminution in value theory is rooted in Pennsylvania v. Mahon and requires a comparison
of the value before and after the regulation. See Mahon, 260 at 413-17; Goldblatt v. Hemstead, 369
U.S. 590, 595 (1962). The Court in Penn Central considered the extent to which the regulation
frustrates distinct investment-backed expectations. Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104, 127.
43. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
44. Id. at 136.
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the ground that it did not affect Penn Central's present uses of the building
and allowed them to continue using it as in the past. Second, the regulation
permitted Penn Central to obtain a profit from the building and a "reasonable return" on investment."5
The focus of facial challenges to a land-use regulation, as in Keystone,
has been on whether a taking interferes with the owner's investmentbacked expectations, and not on the diminution in value caused by the
regulation. In Agins, the appellants acquired five acres of unimproved
land with the "highest market value" in scenic Tiburon for residential
development, including multi-family dwellings.' Subsequently, the city
of Tiburon adopted zoning ordinances which restricted residential development to one-family dwellings, accessory buildings, and open-space
uses.47 Agins alleged that the ordinance violated the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment on the basis that the ordinances had completely
destroyed the value of their property and diminished their investment
expectations.48 The Court upheld the ordinances, despite the diminution
in value, on the ground that they neither prevented the best use of the
owner's land nor extinguished a fundamental attribute of ownership.49
Although the Agins could not build multi-family dwellings as they had
planned, they could still build up to five houses." For these reasons, the
Court found that the Agins had maintained investment-backed expectations so as not to amount to an unconstitutional taking.
Moreover, in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 5'
the petitioners, relying on Mahon, challenged the Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act itself on the ground that it violated the Takings
Clause. 2 The act implemented a regulatory scheme which prohibited
surface mining in certain areas and required "steep-slope mining."" The
District Court found that the effect of the first provision was to prevent
a person from mining his own land or having it mined.' The steep slope
provision required operators to perform the "economically and physically
impossible" task of restoring steep-slope surface mines to their original
contour.5 The Court upheld the act as not affecting the economically
viable use of the land on the ground that it did not prevent beneficial use
45. Id.
46. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 258 (1980).
47. Id. at 257.
48. Id. at 258.
49. Id. at 262.
50. Id.
51. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 293.
54. Id. at 293-94.
55. Id. Even if the steep-slope was restored, the value of the mined land after restoration would
have diminished the value of the land to practically nothing.
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of coal bearing lands; that is, the act did not categorically prohibit surface
coal mining, but merely regulated the conditions under which such operations may be conducted. 6
The "Relevant Unit of Property"
Since Mahon, there has been a distinct trend towards requiring that
economic injuries caused by regulations be demonstrated with precision,
and that the property owner be deprived of all economically viable uses
of the property to sustain either a facial or as applied challenge. In Mahon,
Justice Brandeis argued in his dissent that whether a taking occurs depends
upon the relative unit of property. In his view, if one considers the value
of the coal kept in place by the regulation with the value of the whole
property, there would be no taking. 7
What constitutes the relative unit of property rights, however, has been
expanded in subsequent decisions which are reminiscent of Justice Brandeis' dissent in Mahon. For example, the Penn Central decision adopted
Justice Brandeis' notion that the relevant unit of property is measured
against the parcel as a whole, not pieces of the parcel. 5" In Penn Central,
the Court calculated the diminution in value caused by New York City's
landmark prohibition ordinance not only against the total value of the
Grand Central terminal building, but also against the value of the owner's
other properties in the vicinity. The Court stated that a taking must be
measured against the59owner's entire collection of property rights in the
"parcel as a whole."' Thus, in regulatory takings even a complete destruction of a particular property interest or single segment of a parcel is
not necessarily a taking of property requiring just compensation.'
Specificity of Economic Injury
An emphasis on requiring that economic injuries be demonstrated with
precision has accompanied the expansion of the "relative unit of property." In Mahon, the Court found sufficient economic injury in the fact
the statute destroyed the support estate and for all purposes made the
mining of certain coal "commercially impractical." 6 However, a trend
towards more specificity is evident in Hodel where the Court rejected,
in a facial challenge, the plaintiff's reliance on Mahon to assess the
validity of federal mining laws in absence of proof regarding the "particular estimates of the economic impact and ultimate valuation . ... ,62
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 296.
Pennsylvania v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 419 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978).
Id. at 130-31.
Id.
260 U.S. at 414.
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 295 (1981)..
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Similarly, in Goldblatt v. Hempstead,63 a local ordinance prohibited
excavations below the water line and required excavations below that
level to be refilled. The ordinance was upheld as not constituting a taking
despite the fact that it prohibited the use of the soil itself and prevented
the owners from removing sand and gravel. The Court noted that there
was no evidence that the prohibition of mining would substantially reduce
the value of the lot and that diminution in value is not conclusive.' 4
In short, prior to Keystone, the modem trend of takings cases casts
some doubt on the validity of Mahon. In facial challenges, such as Agins
and Hodel, the Court has focused on investment-backed expectations
rather than diminution in value. The expansive interpretation of the relevant property unit and the need for specificity as demonstrated in Hodel
suggested that a modern Mahon would be treated differently.
ANALYSIS
In Keystone, the Court directly confronted Mahon due to its "strikingly
similar" factual situation. The basis of the Keystone decision and the
thrust of the petitioners' challenge rested on Mahon. Justice Stevens,
writing for the majority, distinguished Mahon and held that the restrictions
in the Subsidence Act and the destruction of the support estate did not
violate the Takings Clause.
The Court first distinguished Mahon and found that the Subsidence
Act, unlike the Kohler Act, furthered substantial state interests. The
Subsidence Act was a prime example that "circumstances may so change
in time . . . as to clothe with such a [public] interest what at other times
...would be a matter of purely private concern." 65 Thus, the Court was
able to find "public concerns" which were absent in the Kohler Act. The
gist of the newfounded public concerns lay in specific and detailed legislative findings about the dangers of subsidence and the need for legislation.'
After finding that the Subsidence Act substantially furthered a public
interest, Justice Stevens observed, that "we need not rest our decision
on this factor, alone," because Keystone failed to make a showing of
diminution in value sufficient to satisfy the test in Mahon.67
The petitioners in Keystone challenged the Subsidence Act itself and
in reliance on Mahon asserted that the act denied them the economically
viable use of their land by destroying certain segments of their property,
namely, 27 million tons of coal physically required by the act to be left
63. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
64. Id. at 594.
65. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 488 (citing Block v. Hitch, 256 U.S. 135, 155 (1921)).

66. Id. at 485-88.
67. Id. at 492-93.
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in the ground and the value of the support estate which, in Pennsylvania
is a separate property interest. The destruction of these segments would,
as in Mahon, make it commercially impractical to mine "certain coal,"
and when placed into the diminution of value formula, would result in a
taking.
The Court, however, in rejecting the petitioners' argument, made clear
that to prevail in a facial challenge, specificity of economic injury must
be proven with respect to one's aggregate property rights. The petitioners'
claim was an "uphill battle" in the absence of evidence that the Subsidence
Act caused specific economic injury and made it commercially impractical
to mine bituminous coal."
The cornerstone of the Keystone decision rests on the notion from Penn
Centralthat frustration of investment-backed expectations and diminution
in value will be measured against an owner's relevant unit of property.
The Keystone Court, however, went one step further than Penn Central
by noting that a critical question in determining diminution in value is
how to define the unit property whose value will furnish the denominator
of the fraction. 69 In Mahon, the denominator and relevant unit was the
support estate which was destroyed by operation of the Kohler Act and
resulted in an unconstitutional taking. In Keystone, the Court did not
consider deprivation of the support estate or coal required to be left in
place as relevant units of property to which value can be attached. 0 From
this premise, the Court's conclusion was inevitable: if the amount of coal
required by the act to be left in the ground and the support estate do not
constitute relevant units of property to which value can be attached, there
could be no diminution in value and no taking.
The question Keystone posits and leaves open is what is the "relevant"
unit of property within an owner's bundle of property rights? Justice
Stevens noted that this question may give rise to definitional issues which
its decision does not purport to solve. 7 In Keystone, the fact that Pennsylvania law regards the support estate as a separate, recognizable real
property interest did not bind the Court to conclude that it was a "relevant"
strand for takings purposes. The Court noted that Pennsylvania property
law was simply based on "legalistic distinctions within a bundle of property rights." 72 Since the petitioners own the mineral estate and can continue to mine profitably, the destruction of the support estate, with respect
to the rest of the petitioners' estate, would not effect a taking.73 Conse68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 495.
Id. at497.
Id. at 501.
Id. at 497.
Id,at 500.
Id. at 501.
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quently, the Court effectively obliterated the significance of the support
estate.
The Keystone Court similarly found that the 27 million tons of coal
required by the Subsidence Act to be left unmined and in place did not
constitute a separate, relevant parcel of property for takings purposes.
The Court rejected Holmes' statement in Mahon that to make it "commercially impractical to mine certain coal has the same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating it"'74 as requiring the Court to focus
on individual pillars of coal as relevant units of property. The Court
noted, citing Penn Central, that takings jurisprudence does not divide a
single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether
rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. 7' Thus, the
pillars of coal in Keystone (27 million tons of coal), when viewed in the
context of the petitioners' total ownership of coal, amounted to only two
percent.7 6 The Court reasoned that this percentage, when compared to
the "reasonable" unit of petitioners' coal mining operations and investment-backed expectations, could not result in economic deprivation.77
The Court also followed the trend evident in Hodel and required specificity of economic injury to successfully challenge a land-use regulation.
However, unlike prior facial challenges in Agins and Hodel, which emphasized the parties' investment-backed expectations, the Court made
clear that specificity must accompany a precise showing of diminution
in value.78 Thus, the Court noted that even if the support estate was a
relevant segment of property which was destroyed by the Subsidence Act,
the claim would fail due to lack of specificity. The petitioners had failed
to include in the record any evidence on what percentage of the support
estate would have been affected by the act. 79 Moreover, the fact that, by
operation of the act, 27 million tons of coal would be left in the ground
was not enough proof to show unprofitability so as to make it commercially impractical to mine. ° The absence of specificity of economic injury
could not sustain the necessary showing of diminution in value required
to prevail in a facial challenge.
CONCLUSION
The Keystone decision clearly reflects changing attitudes which proved
fatal to the petitioners and their reliance on Mahon. The expansive concept
of the relative unit of property and the increased need for specificity
provided the Court with an avenue for rejecting the petitioners' argument.
74. id.at 498.
75. Id. at 497 (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978)).

76. Id. at 496.
77. Id. at 498-99.
78. Id. at 496-97.
79. Id. at 496.
80. Id.
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Keystone emerges with several factors which future courts and landowners
must consider. First, Keystone leaves open the question of how to define
what constitutes the relevant unit of property. As the dissent pointed out,
the need to consider the effect of regulation on an identifiable segment
of property makes all important the difficult task of defining the relevant
parcel. 8 This task will become important for property owners, who, as
with Keystone, own large segments of property rights. Unfortunately,
Keystone gives little guidance on this definitional issue.
Second, the Court clearly indicated that the determination of when a
regulation constitutes a taking requires a cost-benefit analysis in which
there are no hard set rules. The requirement that diminution in value of
the relevant unit of property be measured against the aggregate of a
landowner's property rights hinders the ability of holders of extensive
property to succeed in future takings challenges. Under Keystone, the
fact that 27 million tons of coal amounted to only two percent of Keystone's aggregate properties was crucial. Clearly, the heavy burden of
overcoming diminution in value corresponding to an owner's bundle of
property rights will discourage future takings challenges.
Finally, the requirement of a specific showing of economic injury will
make it difficult, if not impossible, to successfully prevail in a facial
challenge. The irony of requiring specific economic injury and diminution
in value in facial takings challenges is evident where, as in Keystone,
these challenges are brought precisely to avoid what was fatal to the
petitioners in Keystone-specific factual inquiries and findings. For example, the parties in Keystone noted that an applied challenge would
involve complex and voluminous proof which neither party was in a
position to present.8 2 However, a factor the Court found in rejecting the
petitioners' challenge was the lack of specific economic proof.
The Keystone decision casts serious doubt on the viability of a facial
challenge to a land-use regulation. However, the Court made clear that
it is striking a balance. If the relevant unit of property is not measured
against the parcel as a whole, then there is a threat that every regulation
could turn into a taking. In striking the proper balance, the Court echoed
the words of Justice Holmes in Mahon: "Government could hardly go
on if to some extent values incident to property cannot be diminished
without paying for every such change in the general law." 3 In Keystone,
the balance weighs against the landowner in order to further important
public policy.
SUSAN MANGES McMICHAEL
81. Id. at 514-15 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 493.
83. Id. at 473 (citing Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413).

